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I. INTRODUCTION
As patent, copyright, and other intellectual property rights have as-
sumed greater economic importance, the manner in which those rights
are used has come under increased scrutiny. Recently filed antitrust liti-
gation against Microsoft Corporation, for example, focuses on the terms
under which Microsoft has licensed its Windows® operating system to
* Dean and Melville Madison Bigelow Professor of Law, Boston University School of
Law; consultant to Microsoft Corp. The author is grateful to David S. Evans, Keith Hylton,
Maureen O'Rourke, George L. Priest, and Bernard Reddy for helpful comments and to Bos-
ton University and Microsoft Corp. for research support.
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computer manufacturers (generally referenced as OEMs, for Original
Equipment Manufacturers). In particular, parties to the litigation com-
plain about the license agreements' requirement that the first screen to
appear when customers initially turn on ("boot up") a computer display
certain features common across all Windows-based platforms.' The
"first screen provision" has been portrayed as evidence that Microsoft
seeks to undermine competitors in the computer software market.2
For antitrust buffs, there are serious arguments over the "so what"
question One view is that even if Microsoft does whatever it can to
undermine competing software producers, it has done nothing that has
violated antitrust laws. Everyone knows that Microsoft's Chairman, Bill
Gates, is the world's richest man and that Microsoft is one of America's
business giants. But neither wealth nor business success confers mo-
nopoly power, and monopoly power itself does not violate the antitrust
laws. If Microsoft is merely a big, successful competitor, there is no
antitrust issue. This view is bolstered by the fact that, notwithstanding
its prominence, Microsoft accounts for less than ten percent of computer
software sales (suggesting that it has by no means captured the software
market or many pieces of it) and faces vigorous competition in every
line of business.'
Microsoft does supply a very large proportion of operating systems
for personal computers, having dramatically outdistanced the competi-
tion with its Windows operating system for Intel-compatible computers.
All of those challenging Microsoft start with the predicate that its Win-
dows system is the de facto standard for most types of personal
computer in the U.S.5 Plaintiffs assume that Microsoft has monopoly
power as a result of Windows' success6 and argue that Microsoft has
1. See U.S. Department of Justice Complaint [hereinafter DOJ Complaint] at 31-34,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1232 (D. D.C.) [hereinafter Micro-
soft]; State Attorneys General Complaint [hereinafter State's Complaint], State of New York
ex rel. Dennis C. Vacco, et al. v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1233 (D.
D.C.)[hereinafter Vacco].
2. See DOJ Complaint, supra note 1; State's Complaint, supra note 1, at 11.
3. See, e.g., American Enterprise Institute For Public Policy Research, The Amgen Fo-
rum: The Law And Economics of U.S. v. Microsoft, Federal News Service, June 18, 1998,
available in LEXIS, Commercial and Trade Speeches or Conferences Library.
4. A survey of 639 leading software firms puts Microsoft at 8.58% of global software
sales, well'behind IBM's 12.38%. International Data Corp., Worldwide Software Revenues,
1995-1996 (1997).
5. See DOJ Complaint, supra note 1, at 1; State's Complaint, supra note 1, at 11;
Declaration of Franklin M. Fisher, in Microsoft [hereinafter Fisher Declaration]; Declaration
of David S. Sibley, in Microsoft [hereinafter Sibley Declaration]; Declaration of Frederick R.
Warren-Boulton, in State's Complaint.
6. Complainants define a narrowly drawn market in operating systems for personal
computers as the arena in which Microsoft allegedly exercises monopoly power and ask that
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misused the advantage it enjoys with the success of Windows by various
actions, particularly provisions in contracts licensing others to use Win-
dows.
The plaintiffs do not claim that Microsoft is engaged in or is facili-
tating a horizontal conspiracy-as would occur if Microsoft agreed with
competing software firms to restrain output in a given product line. In-
stead, plaintiffs allege that Microsoft's vertical relations with other
firms-in which Microsoft contracts with others in a principal-agent
relationship-improperly use the power of its copyright for Windows
and that system's success in the marketplace. That is the essence of the
complaint respecting the first screen provision: that the rights conferred
by copyright do not permit Microsoft to ask its licensees to bind them-
selves in that way.7
That complaint is problematic in part because it seems on its face to
stand copyright law on its head. Copyright law provides an exclusive
right for the owner to decide when and how to allow the copyrighted
material to be used. Antitrust law, consequently, long has applied dif-
ferent standards to ordinary vertical agreements and agreements
licensing intellectual property rights.! Unfortunately, court decisions
have not followed a single, straight line respecting the relationship be-
tween antitrust and intellectual property right laws, as discussed below,9
and the Microsoft case requires delineation of the way antitrust law
should deal with copyright licensing, if not with contract arrangements
more generally.
Even if that issue is resolved favorably to plaintiffs (who dispute
Microsoft's contention that intellectual property laws trump antitrust),
there is a second problem. Antitrust analysis of vertical relationships
under the rule of reason would require evaluation of the efficiency gains
and costs of the challenged actions. Although such evaluations are done
in many different settings, the complaints' allegations of improper pro-
visions in licensing contracts call for an analysis that parses particular
contract terms. That analysis necessarily entails an artificial assignment
of effects among contract terms and is likely to be distorted from the
considerations informing parties to the contracts.
the court declares that the relevant market for antitrust analysis. See DOJ Complaint, supra
note 1, at 1; State's Complaint, supra note 1, at 6.
7. See id.
8. See, e.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 188-93 (1980);
United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 485 (1926); Bement v. National Harrow
Co., 186 U.S. 70, 92 (1902); USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510 (7th
Cir. 1982).
9. See discussion infra, text and notes at notes 70-72.
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This paper examines the first screen provision in the context of the
law and practice respecting computer software licensing. The first sec-
tion provides background on copyright. The second section explores the
considerations relevant to licensing contracts. The third section ad-
dresses the intersection between antitrust and copyright licensing. The
fourth section directly considers the first screen provision-what it
does, what interests it serves, and what efficiencies it generates. A con-
cluding section argues that, while the provision should pass antitrust
muster, the process of examining such licensing provisions under the
antitrust laws may do more harm than good.
I. COMPUTER SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT
A. Background
It is common today (and correct) to speak of "intellectual property"
(and, concomitantly, of intellectual property rights) as important com-
ponents of our national endowment. But, despite the long history of
such rights, widespread recognition of their importance is a fairly recent
development.
In the eighteenth century, copyright and patent were established
rights in England and in the American colonies, but many leading
authorities placed the labors of literary and inventive creation on a
lower rung than other economic activities. Thus, when Adam Smith
published The Wealth of Nations, he saw the fruits of mental labor as
distinctly different from labor in the fields or the foundry. Smith classed
the effort that produces intellectual property as "unproductive labour"
along with other work that today would be classified as "services," a
class that, in Smith's words, includes the work of "churchmen, lawyers,
physicians, men of letters of all kinds; players, buffoons, musicians,
opera-singers, opera-dancers, &c."' For Smith, productive labor be-
longed to the violinist who manufactured the instrument, not to a
Mozart or Beethoven whose genius shaped the music or to a Heifetz or
Stem whose gifts brought that music to life.
Appreciation of the importance of labor that produced (and per-
formed) creative works grew slowly, alongside the changing focus of
work more generally. A snapshot of the United States' economy in
1800, 1900, and today illustrates the broader change. In 1800 two-thirds
of the workforce was engaged in agriculture. In 1900, that had declined
to one-third, while more than half the workforce was engaged in manu-
10. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA-
TIONS 330-31 (R. H. Campbell & A. S. Skinner eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1776).
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facturing. As we approach 2000, a tiny fraction of the workforce is en-
gaged in agriculture, and less than one-third in manufacturing, while
more than two-thirds provide services."
The shift from agriculture, to manufacturing, to services was paral-
leled by an increase in investment, in learning (both formal and on-the-
job), in research, and in development of new ideas and means of expres-
sion. These in turn have provided returns to investors and supported
economic growth. Recently, the trend to greater returns to investment in
human capital (whether protected by specific legal entitlements or not)
has accelerated, as is typical of periods of great change.'2 It is, as dis-
cussed below, more doubtful that returns to innovative activity in
general have increased, but public assertions of the importance of
knowledge-based activity-including innovative activity-have bur-
geoned, with references to the "information age" already sounding trite.
B. Copyright: Constitutional and Statutory Roots
At law, innovative activity is separated from other types of labor.
The Constitution of the United States grants Congress the power "to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."'3 James Madison explained the constitu-
tional provision as one that both advanced public interests and preserved
rights enjoyed by authors and inventors at common law. 4 Madison's
assertion about common law is not perhaps sound history, though he can
be forgiven-that exact issue divided the English House of Lords at
about the same time as the American Revolution (the Lords ultimately
concluding that the common law did not support copyright prior to the
Statute of Anne in 1710).'" Madison's assertion that copyright and
patent advanced public interests, however, was sufficiently accepted
that the constitutional provision was not debated and the nation's first
11. See Ronald A. Cass & Eli M. Noam, The Economics and Politics of Trade in Serv-
ices: A United States Perspective, in RULES FOR FREE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES
43, 45, 46-49 (Daniel Friedmann & Ernest Joachim Mestmdcker eds., Nomos Verlagsge-
sellchaft 1990).
12. See Marvin H. Kosters, An Overview of Changing Wage Patterns in the Labor Mar-
ket, in TRADE AND WAGES: LEVELING WAGES DoVN? 1, 28-31 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Marvin
H. Kosters eds., 1994).
13. U.S. CON T. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14. See THE FEDERALIST, No. 43 (James Madison).
15. For an extended discussion of the English and American authorities, See Howard B.
Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Com-
mon Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119 (1983). See also ROBERT A. GORIAN & JANE
C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 1-5 (4th ed. 1993).
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federal copyright law, the Copyright Act of 1790, was enacted by the
First Congress.
The original copyright law, "An Act for the encouragement of
learning," gave authors rights in maps, charts and books.'6 Revisions of
the law five times over the next 80 years added new categories of work,
beginning with etchings and engravings and expanding through various
types of music, drama, paintings, designs, and photographs.' A general
revision, the Copyright Act of 1909, further expanded the classes of
copyrightable work and served for nearly seven decades as the template
for American copyright protection. During that time, additional changes
in technology brought new subjects-starting with motion pictures,
added by statute in 1912-to the copyright table.
The biggest change during the time that the 1909 Act was in force
was not in the nature of works that were presented for copyright protec-
tion but in the nature of the protection sought by rights holders. The
reason is that the primary alterations of the technological landscape over
that period, as relevant to copyright, created new means of reproducing,
of disseminating, and of exploiting creative works. Radio, television,
photocopying, audio recording, video recording, and other technologies
were invented or dramatically improved in this era. Efforts to rewrite
the copyright law to account for such changes began while some of the
technologies that posed the greatest problems for the 1909 regime were
in their infancy and finally reached fruition in the new copyright law of
1976.8 As Professor Ed Kitch and Dean Harvey Perlman explained soon
after the law's enactment, the new law shifted the emphasis for copy-
right analysis:
Under the old law the starting principle was: the owner shall
have the exclusive right to copy his copies. Under the new law
the principle is: the owner shall have the exclusive right to ex-
ploit his work.'9
The limits of that right are what is in issue in the litigation against Mi-
crosoft.
Of course, the 1976 law did not end the legal story. Statutory
amendments in 1980, 1988, 1990, 1992, and 1994 have addressed issues
raised by particular technologies, including computer software (though
16. 1 Stat. 124. See also EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULA-
TION OF THE COMPETITIVE PRocEss 620 (2d ed. 1979).
17. See id. at 621 (describing statutes of 1802, 1831, 1856, 1865, and 1870 amending
copyright law); See also GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 15, at 7-8.
18. See General Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
19. KITCH & PERLMAN, supra note 17, at 622.
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software was already covered by the protections of the 1976 statute),20
and have altered the law to conform to international treaty obligations.
The 1980 amendment clarified the application of copyright to computer
software programs and the need for permission prior to inclusion of a
program in a computer (with narrowly tailored exceptions). 2 Despite the
amendments, copyright law still follows the basic orientation of the
1976 Act.
C. Copyright: Regime Assumptions
The copyright law gives to the creator of an expressive work the -
right to determine how that expression is used during a specified term of
years. Typically, the work expresses an idea, though eligibility for copy-
right is not tied to the clarity or quality of the idea. Copyright protects
the expression, not the idea expressed.' Ideas are in the public domain,
but each original expression is protected against replication without the
consent of the owner23 Protection of the form but not the content as-
sumes that there is an important (if at time modest) creative aspect to
the expression itself-that "to be or not to be" is not the same as
"should I kill myself?" even if the phrases' meanings are equivalent.
Patent law, in contrast, gives broader protection but for a more lim-
ited time. Patent law, like copyright, does not formally protect ideas, but
its protection goes well beyond mere intentional use of a prior expres-
sion. Patent protection against use of an idea expressed in certain
tangible forms without consent includes protection against using
forms (machines, processes, and so on) closely related to but different
from the patented form.24 The broader protection demands a higher
threshold before protection is obtained. Unlike copyright, which is
20. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). See also H.R. REP. No. 94-1733 (1976); Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247 (3d Cir. 1983); GINSBURG & GOnIAN,
supra note 15, at 685, 694-95.
21. See Pub. L. 96-517, 17 U.S.C. § 101. The rationale for the 1980 amendments was
provided in NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS, FINAL REPORT (1978) [hereinafter CONTU REvr.].
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (1976).
23. See, e.g., Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986);
Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1993). But see Computer Associ-
ates Int'l, Inc. v. Altal, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 704-12 (2d Cir. 1992) (describing limits on scope
of protection).
24. There are competing explanations of the organizing principle behind the scope of
patent protection. See, e.g., Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissi-
pation, 78 VA. L. REv. 305 (1992); Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of
Information and the Rewards to Inventive Activity, 61 AI. EcoN. RiEv. 561 (1971); Edmund
W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977); Rob-
ert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on
Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 803 (1988).
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available without prior screening for any expression, patents are issued
only after certain requirements are met, including the requirement that
the invention be novel and not be obvious to sophisticated observers
familiar with the prior learning on the subject (prior "art").
Because patent requires a greater degree of novelty than copyright,
fewer patents are issued and it is less costly to determine what is pat-
ented than what is copyrighted. Professor Landes and Judge Posner
conclude that the lower cost of identifying patented innovations implies
that inventors will be more likely to know about patented innovations
relevant to their work than about copyrighted innovations and less likely
accidentally to infringe; that, in turn, suggests a greater reason to grant
stronger protection to patents than to copyrights.2' That, indeed, is the
way the law has developed. Crudely put, the difference between the two
intellectual property rights schemes is this: copyright allows the creator
of a new expression of an idea the right to decide how and when that
expression is used but no right against innocent or accidental or certain
incidental use; patent provides the creator of a new idea, embodied in
useful form, the right to prevent all manner of activity that uses that idea
without consent.27
Despite this distinction, the intellectual property rights regimes, are
closely related. Both forms of intellectual property protection rest on
three assumptions about creative works. First, intellectual property law
assumes that the grant of an economically valuable right will increase
the rate at which new creative works are produced (and increase the
value of those creative works).' Second, the law assumes that creative
works have "public goods" aspects-that they are costly to protect and
can be used by many people at once without affecting the quality of the
use (unlike many people trying to share a single automobile).29 The sec-
ond assumption suggests that intellectual property produces value
substantially greater than its creators could capture without special pro-
25. In patent law, novelty is a separate requirement from nonobviousness, but the term
novelty is used here to embody both requirements.
26. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
27. See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen & Leo Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Eco-
nomics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. EcON. PERsP. 3 (1991).
28. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Sony Corp. of America v. Uni-
versal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). See also Hirshleifer, supra note 24; Kitch,
supra note 24; Stan J. Liebowitz, Copyright and Indirect Appropriability: Photocopying of
Journals, 93 J. POL. ECON. 945 (1985).
29. See Besen & Raskind, supra note 27; Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Fail-
ure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82
COLUM. L. REv.1600 (1982) [hereinafter Betamax]; Hirshleifer, supra note 24; Landes &
Posner, supra note 26.
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tections. That indicates, in line with the first assumption, that, without
such protections, too little creative work will be produced. Finally, the
law assumes that the costs of restricting use of new expressions and in-
ventions are less than the benefits of new creativity.
There is a lively academic debate about these assumptions. 3' Fortu-
nately (for the continuing liveliness of that debate) there is no likelihood
of proving or disproving the assumptions. They will continue to shape
the law while academicians continue to argue their merits.
D. Copyright in Computer Software
The protection of computer software through copyright also was a
subject that was debated. The debate was not whether computer soft-
ware deserved protection similar to that granted other intellectual
property. Both proponents and opponents of copyright protection for
software agreed that software development required the same sort of
creative activity and depended on the same sort of financial and per-
sonal investment as other intellectual property and was no less
deserving of legal protection.
The dispute over computer software-so far as it differed from the
more general debate over the appropriate scope and duration of intel-
lectual property rights-centered on the question of which intellectual
property regime best fit the realities of this particular form of creative
work. 2 Software consists of two sets of instructions, source code and
object code. The first of these, source code, is the set of directions that a
programmer writes indicating what he wants the program to do-start
the computer, boot up a screen, put certain images on that screen, and so
on. The second instruction set, object code, is the translation of the
source code's instructions into the binary language in which computers
30. E.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
31. E.g., Stephen J. Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARv. L. REV. 281 (1970); Grady & Alex-
ander, supra note 24; Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The
Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and "Encouragement" Theory, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1343
(1989) [hereinafter Challenges]; Landes & Posner, supra note 26; Robert P. Merges & Rich-
ard Nelson, Market Structure and Technical Advance: The Role of Patent Scope Decisions,
in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1992); Tom Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law
and Economics Approach, 12 HAMLINF L. REv. 262 (1989).
32. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 26, at 2310 n.1; Pamela Samuelson, et al., A
Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
2308 (1994) [hereinafter Manifesto]; John T. Soma, et al., Minimizing Reverse Engineering:
Sample anguage for Dual United States and European Union Software Licenses, 24 DENY.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 145, 147-51 (1995).
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function, actually speaking to the computer.33 The argument over soft-
ware protection largely revolved around the fact that object code is
"read" only by computers, and thus seemed to some commentators more
appropriately assimilated to the patent regime than to the copyright re-
gime.
34
The choice between these regimes was central to the work of the
National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works (CONTU). The CONTU report in 1978 resolved the matter in
favor of copyright protection, concluding that innovation in software
worthy of protection tended to occur too rapidly and along too many
margins to be suitable to a patent regime. Both source and object code
fit better with the copyright model, even though the expressive element
of object code is not directly evident to a human audience.35 Congress,
which had included software already as a "literary work" eligible for
copyright protection, adopted the CONTU approach two years later,
making copyright coverage clearly applicable to software.36
III. COPYRIGHT LICENSING
A. What is Licensed?
In keeping with the basic approach of the copyright law, copyright
owners are given great freedom in deciding the terms on which to li-
cense their products. After all, the value of the copyright is the ability of
33. Source code can be translated into object code through a compiler (which generally
is a device located outside the computer on which the program will run). The compilation
process produces a translation of the source code that can be configured to execute instruc-
tions at optimum speed. An alternative to compilation is to use an interpreter (which
generally is located inside the computer that is running a program) to translate source code
into object code on a line-by-line or instruction-by-instruction basis. The interpreter does not
retain memory of prior instructions, so that, unlike with a compiled program, repeated func-
tions must be explained to the computer in full detail each time.
34. See discussion and citations in U.S. CONGESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-
MENT, FINDING A BALANCE: COMPUTER SoFrwARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND THE
CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (Gov't Printing Office 1992) [hereinafter OTA
REPT.]; at 68-69, 130. Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Da-
tabases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARv. L.
REv. 978 (1993); Maureen O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Con-
tract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479, 484-85 n. 20
(1995); Samuelson, et al., Manifesto, supra note 32. See also Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983).
35. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983); CONTU REPT., supra note 21.
36. See Pub. L. 96-517, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1980).
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the right owner to set terms expected to maximize the return from li-
censing. 37
Licensing agreements cover all manner of terms. Among the sub-
jects to be found in license agreements are: the period of time during
which the licensed material can be used, the use allowed of the material
(including elaborate restrictions on various aspects of licensed perform-
ances), allocation of rights to derivative works, constraints on disclosure
of information contained the material or obtained from the material,
assignment of liabilities (including some tax liabilities), specifications
for (or constraints on) sublicensing, provision for changed circum-
stances (including changes in corporate identity or ownership), price
and payment terms, provisions respecting bankruptcy during the con-
tract period, and survival of obligations (such as nondisclosure)
following license term."
Agreements range from the very simple to the incredibly complex,
from the painstakingly negotiated to the standard-form contract. As a
rule, the market for the particular work or type of work will determine
the form in which a licensing contract is crafted. At one end, works that
will be used infrequently, in ventures that are idiosyncratic (rather than
fitting off-the-shelf patterns), and that could prove highly lucrative are
strong candidates for individually negotiated agreements. At the other
end, copyrighted works that are likely to have numerous uses by widely
scattered entities whose demand for the works is sufficiently elastic that
separate negotiations, even fitting well-defined patterns, are inconceiv-
able-most uses of recorded music fit this example-may be handled
under a group or blanket license arrangement. 9
B. What Interests Does Licensing Serve?
Although practicing lawyers who write about copyright licensing
commonly explain the importance to all contracting parties of careful
license negotiation (a subtle reminder of the value of the lawyers'
37. See Besen & Raskind, supra note 27; Betamax note 29; O'Rourke, supra note 34.
See also Challenges, supra note 31, at 1356-58, 1368-70 (broad privilege consistent with
common law property rights doctrine).
38. See, e.g., MARK L. GORDON, COMPUTER SoFrw Aa: CONTRACTING FOR DISTRIBU-
TION AND DEVELOPMENT 243-375 (1985); H. Ward Classen, Fundamentals of Softvare
Licensing, 37 IDEA 1 (1996).
39. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979)
(declaring that blanket licenses used by BMI-like licenses used by the American Society of
Composers and Publishers, ASCAP-are not per se illegal tying arrangements). In some
instances, even the blanket license is too burdensome a mechanism. Those instances fall
within the "fair use" exception. See Betamax, supra note 29.
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services),' other commentators sometimes assume that copyright
license terms are selected solely by the licensor (right owner)." At times
that assumption is paired with the conclusion that license terms solely
benefit the licensor, with the licensee being disadvantaged by them.
2
The image of an all-controlling licensor is at once a natural out-
growth of the copyright regime and a gross distortion of reality. It is
natural in the sense that the copyright regime is a property rights re-
gime: The owner of a copyright has the exclusive right to determine
how the right will be exercised, how the copyrighted work will be used,
and thus will agree only to license terms that are to the licensor's bene-
fit. Saying that, however, does not mean that license terms are
unilaterally dictated by licensors independent of the interests and wishes
of licensees.43
The notion of the licensor acting independent of the preferences of
putative licensees is the same as the notion of a grocery store acting
solely in its own interest, without regard to the tastes of its potential
customers. It is true that the grocery store sets prices for its products
without engaging in separate negotiation with each customer. (That
generally is not the case for copyright licensing, although it is the case
with so-called "shrink-wrap" licenses.)44 But the licensor, like the gro-
cery store,45 is limited in what it can charge by what customers are
willing to pay, which is dictated by the particular preferences of each
customer and the alternatives available to them. The grocery store may
set a price for beef or strawberries or milk without negotiation, but set-
ting the right price-the one most advantageous to the store-requires
that the price also be one that is attractive enough to enough customers
that the store could not do better by lowering its price. To do that in a
competitive market, the store must set prices that balance the store's
interests with the customers' interests in the same way it would if the
parties engaged in face-to-face negotiation over prices-regardiess of
40. E.g., Classen, supra note 38; Thomas Hemnes, Restraints on Alienation, Equitable
Servitudes, and the Feudal Nature of Computer Software Licensing, 71 DENVER U. L. REv.
577 (1994).
41. E.g., Philip Abromats, Comment, Copyright Misuse and Anticompetitive Software
Licensing Restrictions: Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 52 U. 11T. L. REV. 629 (1991).
42. See Microsoft Accused, ECONOMIST, May 23, 1998, at 21, 22.
43. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITAL-
IsM: FIRms, MARKETs, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 85-130 (1985).
44. See O'Rourke, supra note 34.
45. With apologies, "store" here is used as an anthropomorphism, standing as shorthand
for the interests of those who own and operate the enterprise.
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the store owner's wishes, those are the only prices that maximize the
owner's profit.46
What is true for the store owner is true for other sellers and licen-
sors: even where a seller (or licensor) seems unilaterally to be setting
the price to be paid by a buyer (licensee), sensible price-setting must
reflect the interests and preferences of the other party (the buyer or the
licensee). And in ordinary circumstances, the price should be the best
price that other party could hope to obtain through hard bargaining un-
der the circumstances. The statement holds for the terms of a deal (a
sale or a licensing agreement) as well as for the price. You cannot sepa-
rate price from what is being bought; the same considerations hold for
both.' So, even if there were no explicit negotiation, licensing should be
seen as a cooperative venture: Getting it right requires integration of the
parties' interests."
C. What's Wrong with this Picture?
Three caveats need to be offered with respect to the picture drawn
above. One addresses the ubiquitous divergence of the real from the
ideal. The second concerns the problem of having multiple issues in
motion simultaneously. And the third deals with the monopoly compo-
nent of intellectual property rights. The first two are discussed
immediately below, and the third is taken up under the next heading.
The first caveat is that, despite the incentive of sellers and licensors
to set prices and terms that harmonize the interests of the parties, actual
prices and terms may not accomplish that end. The most common rea-
son for the variance is the difficulty of securing the information
necessary to get prices and terms that best fit the parties' interests. The
obvious point here is that it is difficult to gain information about other
people's preferences, which are apt to vary widely. The less evident, but
more fundamental point is that we seldom know our own preferences
with any specificity.49 I may be willing to respond if asked how much I
would pay to obtain particular goods or how much I value specific
46. See, e.g., ARMEN ALCHiAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION:
COMPETITION, COORDINATION, AND CONTROL 85-87 (1977); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE OR-
GANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 5-15 (1968) [hereinafter INDUSTRY]; GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE
THEORY OF PRICE 88-102 (1966) [hereinafter PRICE]; P. DIAMOND, Search Theory, in THE
NEW PALGRAVE: ALLOCATION, INFORMATION AND MARKETS 271, 282-85 (John Eatwell,
Murray Milgate & Peter Newman eds., MacMillan 1989).
47. See ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 46, at 185-86; DIAMOND, supra note 46.
48. "See generally William Baxter & Daniel Kessler, Toward a Consistent Theory of the
Welfare Analysis of Agreements, 47 STAN. L. REv. 615 (1995).
49. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 19-20 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
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features-such as the proximity of a grocery store to my house or the
layout of the store or its decor or its policy with respect to charge ac-
counts-but there is little basis for crediting my statements. As with
merchants who find it necessary to adjust prices over time as they ob-
serve customers' behavior, I am likely to learn what value I place on
particular goods only from experience. With most matters, trial-and-
error is a necessary heuristic.
50
The second caveat concerns an aspect of reality that exacerbates the
general information problems encountered in most markets: although in
textbooks, goods are individual, free-standing commodities, in reality
we are offered choices that bundle many features together rather than
discretely priced, independent goods. Thus, I do not experience sepa-
rately the proximity, layout, decor, and so on, of a grocery store. I do
not experience an infinite number of grocery stores with all possible
combinations of these features, as well as of each good offered for sale.
Instead, I learn that I generally prefer the store that is more brightly lit
and has a better selection, especially of fresh meat, fish and vegetables,
even though it has somewhat higher prices on many items and is a block
or two further from my home. The same is true for virtually every con-
sumer good and the vast majority of intermediate goods as well.5
The information problems that comprise these first two caveats-
which apply to market transactions generally, not only to software li-
censing-do not mean that market prices and terms depart radically
from efficient prices and terms. These two caveats merely indicate that
real prices (and other terms for market transactions) often diverge
somewhat from what might be seen as the theoretical ideal.52 Prices
change over time not only because consumer preferences change and
production costs change but also because markets respond to built-in
feedback mechanisms-such as the experience of shortages of some
goods at prevailing prices and gluts of other goods-that constantly
provide information to help buyers and sellers better identify the right
prices and terms.53 The basic market story, hence, is not the Panglossian
"best of all possible worlds" story but a story of incremental movement
in that direction in a world where the information needed to reach our
50. See id.
51. See, e.g., STIGLER, INDUSTRY, supra note 46, at 14. The information problems pre-
sented by the typical market's bundling of goods also would exist (albeit in different form)
for segregable goods. ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 46, at 110-15.
52. But see STIGLER, INDUSTRY, supra note 46, at 117-20 (explaining that departures
from notions of perfect efficiency are ubiquitous so that efficiency truly should be under-
stood not in terms of abstract ideal but instead in terms of ordinary market functions).
53. See ACHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 46, at 85-87; STIGLER, PRICE, supra note 46.
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goal is too costly, too widely dispersed, and too inconstant for any cen-
tralized process to do better.54
D. What's Different About Copyright Licensing?
The third caveat about the general picture of markets tending to set
efficient prices and terms draws a distinction among incentives in dif-
ferent market settings. This distinction, which has been a subject of
considerable misunderstanding, focuses on market features thought to
correlate with the proximity of parties' incentives to those depicted
above.
In some settings, there is sufficient competition for the seller's (or
licensor's) incentives to approximate those described above, incentives
to set prices and terms that are jointly optimal for the parties to the deal
and that also are efficient from a broader, social perspective. 5 Fre-
quently, such settings are referred to as ones involving "perfect
competition," although far less than perfect competition will suffice to
assure that sellers have the right incentives. Thus, for example, pricing
that looks very much like what would obtain under perfect competition
can, and often does, occur when there are very few sellers in the mar-
ket.56 Indeed, such pricing can occur even when there is only one seller;
the potential ability of others to offer closely competing goods is
17enough to constrain prices to competitive norms.
In some markets with limited competition, however, it is possible
for sellers to profit from setting prices above the competitive ideal and
restricting output below the competitive ideal. This departure from the
ideal is more likely when there are few enough sellers (actual or poten-
tial) to facilitate collusion," and most likely where a single producer
54. FREIDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (Harper & Row 1975) (1942).
55. This definition looks only to allocative efficiency, not to other possible social goals.
56. See JOHN S. McGEE, IN DEFENSE OF INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION 16-23 (1971);
Eugene F. Fama & Arthur B. Laffer, The Number of Firms and Competition, in THE COM-
PETITIVE ECONOMY: SELECTED READINGS 43, 45-47 (Yale Brozen ed., 1975).
57. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL et al., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF IN-
DUSTRY STRUCTURE 349-50 (rev. ed. 1988).
58. See George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 48-49 (1964)
[hereinafter Oligopoly]. Although collusion is a major concern when few sellers occupy a
market (and, merger considerations aside, tends to be the primary concern), actual collusion
is not necessary to produce supra-competitive prices and sub-competitive output. See, e.g.,
JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (MIT Press 1988); Jonathan B.
Baker, Symposium on Tacit Collusion, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1993).
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occupies the field.59 (Put aside, for now, the question of what this means
from either a legal or policy vantage.)
Is this the sort of market in which owners of intellectual property
rights compete? Commentary often assumes that the answer is yes.6'
After all, intellectual property rights, like the general run of property
rights, are designed to give the rights owner a monopoly over a particu-
lar good. The law ascribes to the holders of property rights certain
powers that can be (and at times are) described as those accorded a le-
gally sanctioned monopolist. A homeowner, for example, is legally
entitled to control access to his property (with few exceptions) even if
the terms of this "monopoly" control-the prices for and conditions un-
der which access is granted-do not appear to replicate the operation of
a perfectly competitive market.' So, too, a patent or copyright owner is
legally entitled to control the exploitation of that property, even if this
exercise of "monopoly power" results in different prices and terms than
those that (observers predict) would obtain in a fully competitive mar-
ket.
6 2
That "monopoly," however, does not suggest any particular change
in the marketplace from the competitive paradigm described above. Of
course, the right holder is the sole supplier who can serve the artificially
delimited "market" for the patented or copyrighted work-or at least the
market for new access to that work (as old copies of the work may be in
existence providing competition, perhaps very substantial competition,
to sales or licenses of new copies). But that market is not usefully de-
scribed.
Consider, for example, that roughly 500,000 books, plays, articles,
and stories are registered for copyright in America each year and about
70,000 new book titles are published annually. 3 Each of the authors
enjoys a nominal monopoly with respect to his work. If someone wants
59. See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL.
ECON. 807 (1975).
60. See, e.g., Note, An Economic Analysis of Royalty Terms in Patent Licenses, 67
MINN. L. REv. 1198, 1221 (1983). The tendency of commentators to characterize markets
for goods associated with intellectual property as monopolistic was noted by Professor Ste-
phen Carter: "[C]ommentators constantly refer to intellectual property rights as
monopolies-all right, limited monopolies-even though the typical proprietor lacks the
market power (and often, as Edmund Kitch has noted, the incentive) to extract monopoly
rents." Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property Is Property?, 68
CHi.-KENT L. REv. 715,717 (1993).
61. See generally, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS
(1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD & TENANT (1977).
62. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C.§ 106 (1994); OTA REPT., supra note 34, at 185-86.
63. See Gary Ink, Book Title Output and Average Prices: 1996 Final and 1997 Prelimi-
nary Figures, in THE BOWYER ANNUAL: LIBRARY AND TRADE BOOK ALMANAC 521-22
(Dave Bogart ed., 1998).
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to reproduce a book, use passages from a book, or turn the book into a
stage or screen play, the person must strike a deal with the "monopolist"
who holds the copyright on that work. Yet the book market is intensely
competitive, and many, many people are competing to produce books
and to turn ideas into stage productions and movies.
The nature of this market (and of markets more generally) often is
misconstrued. Casual observers frequently have an unrealistically nar-
row view of the sources of competitive constraint and an unrealistically
expansive expectation of profitability. The most obvious substitute
products-the ones apt to be visible to casual observers-will be those
that most influence the short-run value of a good but rarely are the only
important sources of competition. Indeed, over the longer term, they
frequently are not the most important sources of competition. Atari's
video game system, for instance, had few immediate substitutes, but it
was rapidly supplanted by a better technology.
In the same vein, successful ventures generally are visible to casual
observers but are not representative of overall profitability for a given
class of goods. That is true for copyrighted goods as well as for others.
The most publicized aspect of the book market may be the fact that es-
pecially successful authors can reap huge rewards.64 Once the authors
have created a work that is unusually popular-and at times in anticipa-
tion of it-the authors are thought of as controlling particularly valuable
resources. But the market in which the authors in fact compete is the
intensely competitive market to create such specially valuable goods.
Thinking only of the returns to those who do best in this market dra-
matically distorts the sense of this market, much as focusing only on
Tiger Woods distorts a sense of the market for golf professionals or fo-
cusing on Michael Jordan distorts one's sense of the market for
professional ball players-or, so far as these two athletes are seen in
their role as product pitchmen, focusing on them distorts a sense of the
market for American sports figures, or more generally for public fig-
ures. Whatever the returns to the top players, the creative markets
remain intensely competitive.65
Even though they set terms for access to "monopoly" rights, copy-
right licensing agreements resemble the typical setting in which the
64. See Mark Feeney, High-Stakes Bookmaking; Huge Advances, Readership Slump
Make '90s Publishing a Gamble, Bos. GLOBE, Dec. 10, 1997, at Cl; Bob Hoover, Best
Seller; Michael Crichton Strikes It Rich Before His Latest Book Hits the Stores, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 7, 1996, at D12; Doyle McManus, Gingrich Inks a Book Deal for $4
Million, L.A. TimEs, Dec. 23, 1994, at Al; Jeff Zaleski, The Grisham Business, PUB. WKLY.,
Jan. 19, 1998, at 248; Clancy Deal Worth $100 Million, Cm. SUN-TIaEs, Sep. 8, 1997, at 32.
65. Even in intensely competitive markets, those who control particularly valuable in-
puts-for example, especially fertile land-may earn returns above the norm.
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terms and price of the agreement harmonizes the interests of the parties
(the licensor and licensee) in the same way that a grocery store's prices
reflect the interests of the store owner and potential customers. As noted
earlier, the prices and terms may not be ideal, but as a rule there should
be no greater divergence from the ideal than in the grocery store exam-
ple. The monopoly in the copyright owner's case is analogous to the
grocery store's monopoly over its specific location. Information prob-
lems may distort parties' perceptions of what agreement is best-and
may account for differences between parties to an agreement during ne-
gotiation-but the copyright itself typically is not the cause of any
distortion.66
The prospect of arrangements between parties accounting optimally
for both sets of interests does not, of course, suggest that the interests of
the parties are identical, either before or after agreement. The extensive
literature on "agency costs"-which encompasses writing about pro-
duction by teams, supervision of employees by managers and investors,
and other activities that take place in principal-agent settings-takes as
a given the continued separation of interests even among closely coop-
erating parties operating in a single, commercial enterprise. 7
Nonetheless, this literature explains that, despite the divergence of
parties' interests, each party in such settings has reason to account for
the interests of other parties. Consequently, an extensive variety of
agreements and non-negotiated (but mutually accepted) arrangements
are used to align parties' incentives more closely.6 There appears to be
every reason to presume that software licensing contracts, like other
contracts generally, represent as good an accommodation of the interests
of the contracting parties as can be found.69
66. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (exposing effects of information problem
in market without intellectual property or other monopoly rights).
67. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972); William J. Carney, Controlling
Management Opportunism in the Market for Corporate Control: An Agency Cost Model,
1988 Wis. L. REv. 385; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and
Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REv. 271 (1986); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separa-
tion of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983).
68. See, e.g., Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 67; Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of
Agency, in PRNCn'ALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37 (John W. Pratt &
Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., Harvard Bus. School 1985); Carney, supra note 67; Michael C.
Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
69. The one arena in which there is appreciable question about this assertion is the use
of so-called "shrink-wrap" contracts with ultimate consumers of software. See ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); O'Rourke, supra note 34.
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IV. ANTITRUST AND COPYRIGHT
A. Antitrust Law and Intellectual Property Right "Misuse"
Antitrust law reflects concerns about business practices that under-
mine competition. Discussion of the overlap between antitrust and
intellectual property law frequently observes that the former opposes
monopoly, while the latter confers monopoly rights.70 That observation
does not, however, resolve the questions about how far the monopoly
rights extend and in what circumstances concerns about competition can
limit those rights. Those questions evoke widely varied answers from
experts in antitrust and intellectual property as well as from the courts.7'
Courts struggling with the questions have found life complicated by
decisions expanding antitrust law to reach matters that previously might
have been addressed by equity doctrines and other decisions extending
equity doctrines to subjects squarely within the purview of antitrust.
Defenses to actions for enforcement of patent rights-now termed
"patent misuse"-later extended by analogy to copyright (under the
heading of "copyright misuse") encompassed attempts to use the intel-
lectual property rights in ways that seemed inimical to public policy (or
other traditional equity concerns for enforcers to come before the equity
court with clean hands).72 The only issues dealt with under the "misuse"
headings, however, look very much like staple problems of antitrust
law, which today has evolved into a relatively well-developed body of
law.
That overlap does not mean that the two bodies of law-antitrust
and intellectual property "misuse"-followed similar paths in resolving
the issues both address. Assumptions about market operations that in-
formed the contours of intellectual property rights "misuse" doctrines-
such as the assumption that award of these rights automatically con-
ferred meaningful power over market prices-survived in misuse
70. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, for instance, suggested that patentees enjoy a mo-
nopoly over their invention that includes the right to withhold a license to use it, making
antitrust inquiry into that decision inapposite. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502,519-21 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
71. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); USM Corp.
v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust
Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1813 (1984) [hereinafter Intersection]; Rob-
ert P. Merges, Reflections on Current Legislation Affecting Patent Misuse, 70 J. PAT. &
TRADE MAK OFF. Soc'y 793 (1988) [hereinafter Misuse]; William F. Baxter, Legal Restric-
tions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267
(1966); Mark A. Lemley, Comment, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doc-
trine, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1599 (1990) [hereinafter Irrationality].
72. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
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doctrine long after they were abandoned in antitrust litigation.73 Judges'
resistance to efforts to bring misuse doctrine into line with a body of
antitrust law more sensitive to evolving economic learning led Congress
to intervene in the late 1980s, amending the Patent Act to bring that
body of law into line with antitrust on the issue of market power.74
That change has not sufficed to eliminate conffict between intellec-
tual property law and antitrust law. Some courts and commentators
maintain that a defense of copyright or patent misuse still exists separate
from the antitrust law and extending to actions that do not violate anti-
trust law, even if similar to conduct subject to antitrust attention.75 But
the patent law amendment has reinforced arguments that antitrust
should set the outer limits of whatever misuse doctrine is retained. To a
significant extent, the argument over a separate misuse doctrine now has
become more a matter of aesthetics than substance, given the nature cf
the claims advanced under the misuse doctrine.76
B. Vertical Relations in Antitrust and Copyright
The more trenchant questions are what the content is of whatever
legal rule does govern, and what substantive rule should govern, busi-
ness behavior central to the intellectual property laws and especially to
copyright: licensing others to use the protected work. Plaintiffs in the
Microsoft litigation have urged that intellectual property licensing be
treated no differently from any other activity, while Microsoft has ar-
gued in effect that intellectual property licensing should be immune
from antitrust scrutiny.77 Apart from citations to precedent, Microsoft's
argument stresses licensing arrangements' centrality to the scheme of
the copyright law. Licensing surely tends to provide efficient means of
exploiting intellectual property rights. So far as efficiency defines what
is socially beneficial in business, and intellectual property laws define
what is socially beneficial for creation and exploitation of innovative
talents, one might expect that antitrust-type concerns would play no
role.7
73. See Kaplow, Intersection, supra note 71; Lemley, Irrationality, supra note 71.
74. Patent Act, Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4676 (1988).
75. See Practice Management Info. Corp. v. American Medical Ass'n., 121 F.3d 516
(9th Cir. 1997); Merges, Misuse, supra note 71.
76. See, e.g., Judge Posner's majority opinion in USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc.,
supra note 71.
77. See Vacco v. Microsoft, Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Joint Response to Microsoft's Motion for Summary Judgment
and Reply in Support of Motions for Preliminary Injunction.
78. See Intersection, supra note 71 (arguing that the scope for antitrust concerns de-
pends on the gap between intellectual property laws' ambit and socially optimal protection
for inventive activity).
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It is hard to know how far one can push that expectation. After all,
antitrust laws have been used to regulate a range of business conduct
that commentators find more likely to be beneficial than harmful.79 Most
of the complaints have focused on specific applications of the antitrust
laws, rather than on its broader contours,"° and commentators find much
antitrust law tailored to protect efficient business practices.' Still, anti-
trust law surely is not entirely congruent with efficiency.82
Among the most questionable applications of antitrust is its use to
police vertical relationships.83 Although some practices in vertical deal-
ings can be cleverly disguised horizontal restraints, cogent economic
explanations have been offered for many more vertical arrangements
that have been subject to antitrust scrutiny. These arrangements tend to
promote efficiency, as one should expect with contracts between princi-
pals and agents (buyers and sellers, licensors and licensees).M  The
essence of such contracts is the apportionment of responsibilities be-
tween parties with different competencies and the selection of
mechanisms that will align the parties' interests at the lowest possible
cost-goals oriented to the attainment of efficiencies. 5 Consistent with
the efficiencies that can be expected with vertical arrangements, courts
generally have been more willing to weigh explanations for provisions
in vertical arrangements than in horizontal agreements. 6 Yet courts have
not put vertical arrangements entirely off limits for antitrust.8
If courts do not always shape doctrine in ways that fit efficiency
considerations, they do take account of efficiencies in many settings.
79. See, e.g., THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC CHOICE
PERSPECTIVE (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995).
80. See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, What Do Economists Think About Antitrust?: A Random
Walk Down Pennsylvania Avenue, in McChesney & Shughart eds., id. , at 33, 36-61.
81. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
(1976). See also ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF (1993) (often supporting, but also condemning, antitrust doctrine).
82. See, e.g., McChesney & Shughart eds., supra note 79.
83. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 81, at 245, 288-98, 379-81; Don Boudreaux & Robert
B. Ekelund, Jr., Inframarginal Consumers and the Per Se Legality of Vertical Restraints, 17
HOFSTRA L. REV. 137 (1988); Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as
Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 28 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1988).
84. See, e.g., Baxter & Kessler, supra note 48, at 627 (arguing that confusion on this
point traces to courts sometimes mistaking vertical relationships-those involving parties
engaged in production of complements not substitutes-for horizontal relationships and vice
versa); Boudreaux & Ekelund, supra note 83; Klein & Murphy, supra note 83.
85. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 43, at 85-130; see also Baxter & Kessler, supra note
48, at 620.
86. Compare Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), with Dr.
Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
87. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Continental
TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., supra note 86.
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Courts have given special attention, at least at times, to the efficiency
arguments of patent or copyright licensing arrangements challenged on
antitrust grounds." Of course, efficiency concerns are only put in issue
when two requisites of antitrust claims are established: first, that the
licensor exercises monopoly power. Second, that the licensor has taken
actions proscribed by antitrust law (unless justified) because of their
untoward effect on competition. These are substantial hurdles. In nu-
merous cases, even where monopoly power was proven (or assumed)
courts have expressed concern to keep antitrust law from becoming a
vehicle for second-guessing technical and product design decisions, es-
pecially of intellectual property rights owners. 9 And, more generally,
courts specifically have vouchsafed the propriety of steps by rights
owners to protect the integrity of their products.90
If Microsoft correctly interprets the relation of antitrust to copyright
law, or if these hurdles of antitrust law are not cleared, the inquiry is at
an end. If, however, plaintiffs persuade the court in this case and similar
future cases on the threshold issues of law and fact, courts considering
challenges to copyright license provisions will ask a question similar to
the question presented when technological integration is challenged.
Courts will ask if there is a reasonable explanation (not directed at sub-
verting competition) for the contested choice. In the contract setting,
courts will assess the plausible efficiencies from- the contested provi-
sions. In the usual case, the contracts can be expected to reflect efforts
to achieve efficiencies, to exploit the benefits of copyrighted work, and
to distribute responsibilities between licensor and licensee in a cost-
effective manner.
C. The Problem of Contract Deconstruction
Unfortunately, the complexity of the considerations of contracting
parties and the number of terms that tend to comprise the bundle of
rights subject to contract make it difficult for non-parties (and perhaps
for parties as well) readily to explain what work one term taken alone
88. See USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., supra note 71.
89. E.g., Microsoft, 1998 WL 327855 at *13-*19; Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 542-44 (9th Cir. 1983); California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM,
613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979); International Data Processing, Inc. v. IBM, 585 F. Supp. 1470,
1471-76 (D. N.J. 1984); ICL Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 448 F. Supp. 228, 230-34
(N.D. Cal 1978), 458 F. Supp 423, 439-41 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
90. E.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir.
1988); WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622 (7th Cir.
1982); Gilliam v. American Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); National Bank of Com-
merce v. Shaldee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Tex. 1980). These decisions are
straightforward applications of U.S. intellectual property law, not European-style "moral
right" determinations.
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performs or how eliminating that term would affect price.9' That should
not be a surprise-after all, those were exactly the problems identified
as the ubiquitous reasons for the real world being so troublesome and
messy a place. That is why the game of picking apart complex contracts
ex post invariably resembles efforts to articulate the distinctive contri-
bution each particular ingredient in a cake mix (eggs, flour, etc.) makes
to the cake. How much of the cake's success can we say is attributable
to the eggs? Of course, we can't say.'
But there is considerable temptation to try anyway. The same is true
of efforts to deconstruct licensing agreements, identifying the role
played by specific license provisions. That effort will be a standard part
of antitrust challenges to copyright agreements.
V. THE FIRST SCREEN
One licensing term that has been challenged as specially trouble-
some is the provision in contracts between Microsoft and OEMs that is
known as the first screen provision. Plaintiffs assert that Microsoft alone
benefits from this term and that OEMs, consumers, and other software
producers are harmed. Before discussing the provision, it is helpful to
spell out its dos and don'ts.
A. What Is the First Screen Provision?
The first screen provision in Microsoft's contracts with OEMs
specifies what must appear on the computer screen at the end of the
boot-up sequence when a consumer first turns on (boots up) a computer
on which Microsoft Windows has been installed as the operating sys-
tem.93 The provision has three components: two components that
address the style of the screen and a mandatory content component. For
91. See generally Ronald A. Cass & Clayton P. Gillette, The Government Contractor
Defense: Contractual Allocation of Public Risk, 77 VA. L. REv. 257 (1991); Oliver E. Wil-
liamson, Assessing Contract, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 177 (1985).
92. This example of fruitless analysis is a long-time favorite of Professor James A.
Henderson, Jr., who kindly has not sought copyright protection.
93. When a user turns on a typical computer with a program such as Windows 98 in-
stalled, the computer will initially load and run a program that is part of the computer's basic
input-output system (BIOS) to test the system hardware and look for additional routines in
the system. The BIOS then turns control over to a program located in the "master boot rec-
ord" of the disk drive being used to boot the system, and that program will load the operating
system. Control then passes to the operating system, which goes through another sequence of
locating and/or activating various hardware and software. The entire process commonly is
referred to as the "boot-up" sequence.
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ease of discussion, the scope of the provision (what it applies to) will be
treated as a fourth element of the first screen provision.
1. Style-Desktop: The first, and most basic, style component is
that the first screen must contain the familiar Windows "desktop."
The desktop is a layout for the screen. It consists of a background
(which can be configured in a variety of designs, sometimes called
"wallpaper") on "top" of which are visual cues (icons). Each icon can
be activated by moving a pointer to it and clicking on it (one click or
two, depending on the version of Windows and the system's configu-
ration). The Windows system then inaugurates operation of the
relevant program. This point-and-click procedure replaces the earlier
DOS operating system commands, which required users to memorize
the particular word-commands for specific functions (in application
programs, the older system required users to know particular keys and
combinations of keys). In addition to the icons, a bar runs across the
bottom of the screen that allows users (with the same point-and-click
system) to find and inaugurate the full panoply of programs contained in
the computer. Features such as an "active channel bar" can be added to
the desktop without violating the style constraint.
2. Content-Icons: The second component of the first screen provi-
sion is a requirement that the desktop for that screen include particular
icons that serve as entry points for certain functions. The desktop must
display icons for eliminating files or programs (the "Recycle Bin"), for
transferring files or programs ("My Briefcase"), for access to the differ-
ent files and programs on the hard drive and in other locations ("My
Computer"), for access to local networks ("Network Neighborhood"),
and for file management as well as access to the Internet ("Internet Ex-
plorer"). This component is a mandatory one, not a prohibitory one. The
provision does not preclude the addition of other icons to the screen,
including icons for technologies that duplicate functions represented by
the mandated icons and icons that permit users to change the configura-
tion of the desktop. The contract language respecting icons on the first
screen only lays out the minimum requirements for the first screen
desktop.
3. Style-Icons: The third component of the provision also relates to
the icons but, like the first component, is a matter of style. It specifies
that any icons added to the desktop on the first screen must conform to
the size and general style of the mandated icons. It does not modify the
content component by prohibiting any icons, programs, or functions.
4. Scope: The first screen provision has a very limited scope. It ap-
plies to the first screen that appears when a consumer first boots up a
computer that has been set up with the Windows operating system. It
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does not regulate what consumers can do in subsequent uses of the
computer (though it would proscribe an automatic change programmed
by the OEM to occur on subsequent uses). The screen can be reconfig-
ured by any user so that, after the very first use, the nature and
arrangement of the items on the desktop changes, the features and pro-
grams that are enabled by the simplest (one step) point-and-click
process changes, the background of the desktop changes, and so on,
from merely aesthetic alterations to complete substitution of the entire
user interface structure represented on the screen. The provision does
not require that consumers be left wholly on their own in conceiving
and making such changes. OEMs can facilitate changes-large or
small-by placing an icon on the first screen that can change the default
first screen with a single click, substituting another first screen, or
OEMs could put an icon on the first screen that reveals a menu of possi-
bilities for changing the first screen. The consumer not only is in control
of what appears on subsequent boot-ups of the computer; the consumer
is in charge and not restricted to any preset list of options. The provi-
sion, in other words, is a first-screen/first-time term of the license
agreement so far as consumers are concerned.
B. Why Have a First Screen Provision?
The point made at the start of this section, picking up the thread of
discussion in sections 2 and 3, was the difficulty of decomposing
agreements to assign separate functions to each provision. Sometimes
provisions do have specific, independent functions that can be discussed
meaningfully apart from an overall sense of the contract, but the venture
typically risks misconstruction. In the licensing contracts, as a rule, no
provision will have effects independent of other terms; the trade-offs
implicit in such contracts almost assures that analysis of any single pro-
vision will not capture the net effect of its inclusion.
Evaluation of the purposes served by the first screen provision is not
quite so problematic as evaluation of the provision's effects. Purpose
does not require the same netting out of other terms as is required of
effects analysis. But such evaluations still should be proffered with con-
siderable caution. That said, the first screen provision seems on its face
to serve three purposes.
1. Training Cost Reduction: The first purpose is simple and power-
ful: to reduce the cost to consumers of using the new product. Newness
is an attraction in some arenas, but it more commonly discourages. This
is most easily seen with children. Anyone who has children has ob-
served how much they depend on familiarity. They like to have the
same routines, to do the same things, to read the same books, to watch
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the same shows. Familiarity gives a sense of comfort, of confidence, of
mastery over the external world, of security in doing something that is
already within one's experience. In economic terms, familiarity reduces
the cost of the activity, which makes it more attractive.
Though we seldom attribute to adults the need for security we see in
children-for whom so much of the world is novel and inexplicable-
we do see a ubiquitous interest in lowering costs of our activities. At
times, this cost-lowering impetus looks quite similar to a child's search
for familiarity. How many of us choose the same foods from foreign
language menus so that we will not have to master new terms? How
many of us go to the same places (restaurants, vacation spots, etc.) and
do the same things at them so that we will not have to learn what is to
our liking there or risk disappointment at discovering that the new expe-
rience is not what we hoped?
More generally, familiarity reduces the need for an investment in
training before a product or service can be used effectively. While the
advantage is especially important with products that have large training
costs, even a small savings in cost can be important in many settings.
Everyday products as well as technologically advanced products pro-
vide evidence that we resist investing in training where that is
efficiently avoidable, a point that holds in all settings, including where
the training is easy and the cost seemingly trivial.
Market responses to this lesson also are ubiquitous. Reduced train-
ing costs, for example, explain similarities across numerous products
that are provided in highly competitive markets. Consider examples in-
volving two sorts of buttons: conventions that avoid the need to learn
and adjust to differences explains why men's shirts all button in the
same direction and why telephones tend to have buttons arrayed in the
same layout regardless- of the phone's size or shape or manufacturer.
In the case of Microsoft's licensing agreements, the first screen pro-
vision serves the same purpose as other devices that reduce training
costs. It assures that the first screen a user of any Windows-based com-
puter sees provides the accustomed look of a desktop-familiar to
anyone who uses any computer with the Windows system-with ex-
tremely low-cost methods of gaining access to popular features and
programs.
Two primary routes are provided on the first screen for access to
programs. The lower-cost access is for programs that have an icon on
the desktop already-simply point and click on the icon-and a desktop
that has certain icons on it already (the standard, minimum set) nearly
eliminates any training time or cost for those programs. Further, making
all programs accessible through the "Start" button (the icon at the bot-
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tom left of the first screen)-again using point-and-click technology-
makes the entire array of programs loaded into the computer accessible
at very low cost.
The consequence of this organization of the first screen is that com-
puter users can turn on any computer with Windows and immediately
get into the programs they want without learning new or complex com-
mands. In this respect, Windows combines standardization of computers
using that operating system with simplification of the interface between
user and computer. As has generally been the trend for all advanced
technologies, this environment moves complexity into the software pro-
gram so that the requirements placed on consumers-the training costs,
primarily--can be reduced.'
Moreover, Microsoft's organization of Windows as a "belt-and-
suspenders" approach, providing multiple routes into some key func-
tions, further reduces training costs by allowing unsophisticated users to
continue to go through the most familiar route. This approach provides a
basis for requiring that an Internet Explorer icon appear on the first
screen. Internet Explorer technologies not only provide access to the
Internet, but also provides options for file management, transfer, and
access. The increasing integration of the Internet into everyday com-
puter use-reflected in Microsoft's decision that technologies
associated with Internet access and use should be integrated with other
technologies governing computer operation-changes the consumer
demand for an operating system. The required inclusion of the Internet
Explorer icon, as with the other content-based icon requirements, seems
quite clearly driven by a desire to provide a product with features con-
sumers find useful in a sufficiently standardized package to facilitate
operation.
2. Quality Control: A second reason for the first screen provision is
that it facilitates quality control. If certain features are always present on
the first screen and those features are not modified by OEMs, the re-
sponsibility for assuring that the features work as intended will lie
squarely with Microsoft. Insofar as Microsoft expects to receive the
blame for any quality problems and anticipates that OEM modification
of the features associated with the first screen could generate prob-
lems, it is rational to insist that those features be presented "as is."
This is especially true if the features are important to unsophisticated
consumers. Those are the consumers least likely to be able to navigate
around problems and least likely to be able to assess responsibility for
problems.
94. See GEORGE GILDER, MICROCOSM: THE QUANTUi REVOLUTION IN ECONOMICS AND
TECHNOLOGY 166-68 (1989) (describing how progress is made in computing).
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In many settings, the division of responsibility between one com-
pany and another or between a company and its customers is predicated
on the expectation that one is better positioned to assure the desired out-
come. Professor George Priest's study of consumer product warranties
is one example of the business decisions that turn on such considera-
tions.95 The same principle applies to the relationship among consumers,
software companies, and hardware manufacturers.
In principle, quality control can be maintained in other ways. Mi-
crosoft could agree with OEMs that, if OEM modification of the
operating system software impaired the operation of specified programs
or features, the OEM would cover the costs associated with that prob-
lem. These costs could include costs of fixing the problem, direct costs
associated with loss of consumer confidence in the operating system
(costs incurred to boost consumer confidence to prior levels), and indi-
rect costs such as lost sales.
Modest reflection, however, suggests that this alternative, litigation-
oriented solution is apt to be less efficient than a precaution-oriented
solution. The causation inquiry necessary to a litigation-oriented solu-
tion will be difficult as will the calculation of costs. Contracts are
written to impose liquidated damages penalties or other litigation-
oriented solutions to quality control problems in some circumstances.
But circumstances where that is the efficient solution typically involve
clear responsibility on one contracting party for performing a task (for
which the other party is paying) and some readily ascertained perform-
ance measure as a trigger for the damages penalty.96 That looks very
different from the software-OEM-consumer relationship.
The quality control concern seems especially apposite to contract
provisions that restrict OEMs' capacity to modify the code embedded in
Windows. The challenge to restrictions on deletion of code associated
with Internet Explorer's web browsing technologies flies in the face of
this concern." Internet Explorer technologies have been integrated into
the functioning of Windows 95 and, even more, Windows 98, so that
any attempt to modify the system to eliminate code controlling Internet
Explorer technologies and substitute code intended to duplicate deleted
capabilities is likely to create exactly the sort of problems that give
95. George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297
(1981).
96. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Clarkson, et al., Liquidated Damages Versus Penalties: Sense
or Nonsense?, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 351; Eric L. Talley, Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism
Design, and the Liquidated Damages Rule, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1195 (1994).
97. As noted earlier, it also flies in the face of decisions upholding copyright owners'
control of modifications of their works and decisions upholding rights to integrate technolo-
gies free from judicial second-guessing.
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software programs a bad name. The inclusion of the full Internet Ex-
plorer technologies safeguards against the problems that, even if caused
by an OEM, appear likely to be laid in some measure at Microsoft's
door. From Microsoft's vantage, hence, insistence on the full inclusion
of the Internet Explorer code solves a potential problem in an efficient
manner. Inclusion of the icon representing these technologies, as noted
above, provides a low-cost means for users to gain ready access and an
efficient method of cueing unsophisticated users to the technologies'
availability.
3. Brand Identification: Third, the requirement of a first screen that
has certain uniform features helps maintain brand identity for Windows.
That brand identity clearly is helpful to Microsoft. Consumers who are
familiar with the look and feel of a given brand, who associate easy use
of the computer with that brand, plainly will be more likely to support
that brand. If there is no obvious similarity from one Windows-based
computer to the next, there is relatively little meaning to the brand, so
far as a typical consumer could tell. If it were not possible to limit what
Microsoft's licensees can do, OEMs might find it advantageous to re-
package the Windows program under the OEM label. Though not
clearly a step that would serve either party's interest, it is the sort of risk
principal-agent accords routinely guard against."
The producer-protective aspect of branding is its most obvious fea-
ture. Brand identity is created to help market goods-if a brand is
familiar to consumers, and especially if it is associated with positive
experiences, it will provide a basis for preferring the branded good to
competing goods. The brand is designed to advance the manufacturer's
(or marketer's) interest.
But the brand also has value to consumers. It conveys information
that is important about what consumers will get when they purchase
products grouped under a given brand label." The McDonald's restau-
rant that you have never been to in a city you have never visited has an
expected menu, quality, and cost derived from prior experience with
that brand. The value that consumers place on that information has
earned trillions of dollars for those who have created brand identities
over the past few decades in hotels and restaurants and retail stores,
among other goods and services. The corollary of the franchise brand
value to consumers is that the franchise brand serves interests of the
98. E.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 68.
99. See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1977); Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1964);
Richard Schmalensee, Advertising, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 34
(John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
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franchiser and franchisee as well--or, moving from McDonald's to Mi-
crosoft, the interests of Microsoft and the OEMs.
Although the first screen provision should aid brand identity, it is so
modest a requirement that its utility at branding is limited. The OEMs
have sufficient flexibility to add to the desktop, to customize the desk-
top with different backgrounds, logos, and added functionality, to
reduce the Windows brand identity and to increase the OEM brand
identity. The provision, thus, looks to be a compromise between the in-
terests of Microsoft and the OEMs-which, given the nature of
copyright licensing, is no surprise.
C. Exclusion, Externalities, and Party Interests
The first screen provision serves interests of Microsoft, OEMs, and
consumers. So, what is the concern? Assertedly Microsoft has prevented
rival software companies from gaining access to customers, precluded
OEMs from providing the best software packages for their target cus-
tomers, and impeded customers' access to the software they prefer.'*'
Beyond the assumption that the first screen provision is a unilateral im-
position by Microsoft on other parties (an assumption taken up below),
specific aspects of the provision are claimed to generate specific prob-
lems and demonstrate an anticompetitive purpose. The claims have the
defect of all efforts to deconstruct agreements and depend on
"armchair" conjectures rather than on demonstrated effects cognizable
within the purview of antitrust laws.
1. OEM Brand Interference: The configuration of the first screen
desktop (and its place following the Windows logo), for instance, alleg-
edly impairs the ability of OEMs to create brand identity of their own.'0 1
That allegation seems implausible, given the success of particular
brands, such as Compaq, Dell, IBM, and Gateway, which appeal to dif-
ferent segments of the computer market.
The allegation seems implausible as well because the OEMs have
considerable flexibility to differentiate their products. They can do this
100. See DOJ Complaint, supra note 1; State's Complaint, supra note 1, at 11; Fisher
Declaration, supra note 5; Sibley Declaration, supra note 5.
101. See Sibley Declaration, id. The license agreements between Microsoft and OEMs
prohibit OEMs from altering the boot-up sequence for Windows. This has the effect of pro-
scribing OEM use of the screen for other purposes (including advertising purposes) during
the Windows boot-up, an effect that is allegedly anticompetitive. See DOJ Complaint, supra
note 1, at 32-34; State's Complaint, supra note 1, at 11; Fisher Declaration, supra note 5;
Sibley Declaration, supra note 5. The license agreement does not, however, prohibit licen-
see-OEMs from using a different operating system prior to the inauguration of Windows
operation; the Windows license agreement does not regulate what occurs during boot-up if
an OEM chooses to use another system in addition to Windows to perform functions prior to
starting or switching to Windows.
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by the way they present the desktop, the background wallpaper and lo-
gos they choose for the desktop (including using the corporate logo in a
repeated pattern for the background, as Toshiba and Dell, for example,
have done), the software they choose to offer, and the software they
choose to highlight through icon placement on the first screen. OEMs
also enjoy other opportunities for branding, such as placing logos on the
hardware itself, perhaps beside the computer screen where it is most
likely constantly to be in view, as well as on the box in which the com-
puter arrives-in other words, on places that are first seen and most
obvious to consumers.
If, however, the first screen provision did interfere with OEM brand
identity, that is not obviously problematic. The conclusion would be that
contracting parties would have to decide how much to promote Micro-
soft brand identity and how much to promote OEM brand identity.
Presumably, that is a question, like others in a licensing contract, that
turns on the relative value of the competing interests. If OEMs think
that a contract provision hurts their brand identity, some offset is re-
quired, in price or in other contract terms. There is no reason to believe
that contracts between Microsoft and OEMs have not provided that off-
set, if it indeed is necessary. For those who are concerned about the
ability of contract parties to gain terms they desire, it is noteworthy that
the OEMs tend to be very large commercial enterprises, some signifi-
cantly larger than Microsoft. There is no evidence that these companies
have had difficulty establishing brand identity or that competition
among OEMs has been less than vigorous. And if there is little evidence
of any harm here, there is even greater difficulty in bringing such harm
to OEM brand identity as might exist within the realm of antitrust con-
cerns. 12
2. Icon Inclusion/Program Preclusion: Another claim is that re-
quiring all Windows-based systems to include particular icons on the
first screen prevents OEMs from offering the array of programs they
otherwise would choose to put on the first screen.'O° That may be true.
OEMs might choose to omit some icons for programs that duplicate
those already required by the Microsoft contract. On the other hand,
OEMs might choose to add some icons that otherwise would not be on
the first screen. For example, if Microsoft wants to have access to Inter-
net Explorer technologies available through an icon on the first screen
102. For discussion of the peculiar realm of such concerns, see William H. Page, Anti-
trust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. CH. L.
REv. 467 (1980).
103. See DOJ Complaint, supra note 1, at 32-34; State's Complaint, supra note 1, at
11; Sibley Declaration, supra note 5.
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and the OEM believes that its customers will prefer different browsing
software, the OEM may choose to highlight the availability of an alter-
native browser by placing that icon alongside the Internet Explorer icon.
Under the license agreements, OEMs can place additional icons on the
first screen.
The argument that icons required by the first screen provision have
preclusive effect turns on two claims. First, the desktop is seen as a
scarce resource that does not have space enough for all programs.
Hence, any icon placed on the desktop must preclude some other icon.'°
That argument is specious. Of course, desktop space is scarce in the
same sense in which every resource is scarce. But the space used by
icons required by the first screen provision is only about fifteen percent
of the desktop. The remaining 85 percent is left to the OEMs. It is pos-
sible that even that much space is not enough. But look at the desktop
screens of different computers as the OEMs have configured them. The
OEMs have left a great deal of room on every desktop. That strongly
suggests that they believe that customers do not need many icons on the
desktop-which, in turn, suggests that the icons Microsoft wants placed
on the initial desktop screen do not displace other icons.
Maybe, however, the reason OEMs leave desktop space empty is
that consumers prefer to add their own icons and dislike a desktop with
limited open space. If that is so, the Microsoft icons would be compet-
ing both with other program icons and with open space. That might
mean that Microsoft icons increase the value of remaining icon spaces
on the desktop and could preclude the addition of icons that otherwise
would be there. Again, this armchair theorizing is not rooted in actual
effects. For one thing, if the scarcity problem exists because consumers
prefer to have space to add icons, that implies that those consumers are
in fact capable of moving icons on and off the screen (a task the com-
petent computer user can perform given the way the Microsoft first
screen is set up). But if that is so, then, again, the presence of the Micro-
soft icons on the screen is not terribly significant.
Moreover, the program that so much public and legal attention has
focused on as one that is precluded by the requirement of an Internet
Explorer icon-Netscape's competing browser-is in fact included on a
very large number of first screens.' Not only is it included in the first
screens seen by many consumers who purchase Windows-based per-
sonal computers for their own use; it also is loaded onto many such
computers at work where a great many computer users do the majority
104. See Sibley Declaration, supra note 5.
105. Casual inspection of computers at two local stores revealed that many computers
come pre-loaded with both Windows (including Internet Explorer) and Netscape Navigator.
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of their computer work and where they also frequently acquire comput-
ers for work off-site. Whatever OEMs place on the first screen, for those
users the first screen they see frequently is configured by someone at the
office to have the software and accessibility desired for that workplace.
The second reason given for the assumption that inclusion of Micro-
soft icons on the first screen excludes other icons is a supposed fear of
consumer confusion. The hypothesis is that unsophisticated consumers
would be confused by having two programs that perform essentially the
same function, and for that reason OEMs would be unlikely to place a
second (insert function here: browser program or word processing pro-
gram or spreadsheet program or financial management program) icon
on the desktop.'O' Again, the hypothesis is not logically compelling-
there is no explanation why consumers would find this confusing, any
more than having two types of orange juice to choose from in a grocery
store is confusing. Nor is the hypothesis of confusion rooted in fact-
there is plenty of evidence that OEMs do choose to place duplicate (and
at times triplicate) programs on the computer and icons on the first
screen.
3. Size Matters?-Icons and Markets: A third alleged problem with
the first screen provision is the requirement that all icons have the same
size and general style. This supposedly interferes with the interest of
OEMs in presenting the best software programs to the consumer. The
argument is that OEMs might wish to direct their customers to specific
programs that a particular OEM feels work better for those consumers
and, without the first screen provision in license contracts, would use a
larger icon to prevent consumer confusion.' 7
This argument, too, seems quite weak. First, it is in essence an ob-
jection to the inclusion of a Microsoft-designated icon, not to the size
constraints. But, as discussed above, the inclusion requirement does not
seem to preclude other icons (even though it conceivably could). Sec-
ond, despite the delivery of many computers there is no evidence that
the inclusion of equal sized icons for alternative programs confuses con-
sumers. The hypothetical problem is just that: hypothetical.
Third, it is hard to make this hypothetical problem into a real anti-
trust concern. Even to come close, the hypothetical must be extended;
for example, the argument might be that because the OEM cannot put a
larger icon, it chooses not to put in the icon for a duplicate program.
That means that the advantage of the other (assertedly better) program is
less than the disadvantage of consumer confusion. But the point of the
hypothetical is that better programs are being harmed (by the insistence
106. See Fisher Declaration, supra note 5; Sibley Declaration, supra note 5.
107. See Fisher Declaration, supra note 5; Sibley Declaration, supra note 5.
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on inclusion of the first program's icon and size-equivalence of the sec-
ond program's icon). How much better can the second program be if a
slight chance of consumer confusion is enough to cause OEMs to drop
it?
A different extension of the hypothetical could be that the OEMs
put the duplicate program icon on the first screen but consumers are so
confused that they flood the OEMs with calls. If that is a problem, it is
one that will affect the price OEMs would pay to license Windows with
the first screen provision. That, too, is hardly an issue for the antitrust
laws.
Perhaps the extended hypothetical would be that the OEMs put the
second icon on the screen and consumers who could have been directed
toward one program (of the OEM's choosing) instead pick another pro-
gram, even though the icons are similar in size and placement and both
appear on the first screen. The assumption, then, would be that Micro-
soft gains an illegal advantage over software competitors when both
companies' programs are included in computers, are accessible to con-
sumers on the same terms, and are represented on the first screen by the
same size icons. That assumption is hard to support.
The difficulty with all of the hypothetical examples is that they be-
gin with a licensing provision that does not lend itself to easy
characterization as anticompetitive. It is a far cry from a provision in-
sisting that one firm's programs only must be featured first, that no
program that duplicates its programs can be included in the computer,
that its programs' icons must be twice as big or twice as bright or the
only icons to appear in color-in other words, the hypothetical must go
very far in order to transmute the actual first screen provision into any-
thing that looks even remotely within the ambit of antitrugt.
4. Provision's Provenance: Finally, the first screen provision is
questioned on the basis of Microsoft's advocacy of it. The argument
goes like this: if Microsoft has to urge OEMs to accept this provision,
and perhaps as a result must charge less for licensing the Windows op-
erating system or grant other concessions to OEMs, it must be inimical
to Microsoft's competitors-after all, wouldn't the OEMs favor the
provision if it served a purpose other than handicapping Microsoft's
competition?
Again, the question starts with a plausible predicate and jumps to an
illogical-or at least unnecessary-conclusion. Doubtless, the impetus
for much of the first screen provision comes from Microsoft. Apart
from evidence that some OEMs objected to versions of this provision, it
is obviously in Microsoft's interest to have its brand identity strongly
established, its key technologies prominently displayed, and its pro-
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grams' operations free from quality problems. It obviously is in Micro-
soft's interest, too, to devise an integrated set of technologies that will
appeal to consumers and to insist that OEMs present that as Microsoft's
creation, rather than repackaging it as a set of programs or similar of-
ferings from the OEM.
Just as obvious, however, should be the fact that the provision is not
simply a presentation of Microsoft's desires: OEM interests and con-
sumer interests also play a hand in shaping the contours of the first
screen provision. The provision is tailored to allow variation among
OEMs, to allow addition of programs of the OEMs' choosing, to allow
more non-Microsoft programs than Microsoft programs to be featured
on the first screen, to allow competitors' programs to be featured on an
equal basis, to allow substantial opportunity for OEMs to establish
brand identity as well as to guide consumers' choices among technolo-
gies, and to allow users full flexibility to rearrange the way the screen is
configured and the technologies accessed following the initial boot-up.
The essential function of the first screen provision is one that bene-
fits both Microsoft and consumers but that has less importance to
others, including OEMs and makers of software that is built on the
Windows platform. That function is the facilitation of computer use by
creating enough similarity across computer types and manufacturers, the
reduction of training costs discussed above. The reduced training cost is
experienced directly by consumers and is part of the value of the Win-
dows operating system. But the value is an externality so far as OEMs
and other software firms are concerned, as the reduction in training
costs applies to all Windows-based computers and all Windows-based
software. Some OEMs may want to inhibit consumers from shifting
among different brands of computer (from shifting away from their
brand); some software producers also may want to make it more costly
for consumers to switch away from their products; but Microsoft (in its
role as copyright owner on the Windows operating system) and con-
sumers gain value from the reduction in switching costs.
It would be no surprise if Microsoft is the party most interested in
having a first screen provision in its Windows licensing contracts with
OEMs. It also is of no moment for analysis of the provision's effects.
There are legitimate reasons, wholly apart from Microsoft's interest in
the integrity of its software, supporting such a provision. And the first
screen provision takes a limited approach to assuring that the positive
externalities of low training costs are maintained, an approach that gives
weight to OEM interests and consumer interests as well as the copyright
owner, Microsoft.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The challenge to' the first screen provision in Microsoft's contracts
with OEMs seeks to revisit a complex accord between a principal and
its agents. Because the first screen provision does promote efficiency
and does not impede competition, this challenge should fail. But it
should be understood as part of a pattern of inquiries that take antitrust
law down a path that, ultimately, could become a collision course with -
the rights accorded by our intellectual property laws.
The rights of copyright owners and their ability effectively to con-
tract for licenses that maximize the value of their intellectual property
are put at risk by a legal process dependent on picking apart contract
provisions expost. This process is fraught with difficulty. And, as many
others have noted, that difficulty is conducive to a use of the process
that is far from the public-interest image so often associated with anti-
trust. Indeed, the likely effect of such armchair quarterbacking is that
the antitrust laws become captive of well-placed firms in search of an
industrial policy that protects declining firms against more successful
firms-an outcome likely to frustrate innovation and efficiency and to
harm the public. '°"
The ex post analysis, of course, can be done. And when that task is
performed, the first screen provision passes antitrust muster. In fact,
none of the criticisms of the first screen provision holds up under scru-
tiny. The provision serves quite legitimate ends and supports values that
are broadly shared among consumers even though those values are not a
particular concern for businesses other than Microsoft. In fact, Micro-
soft's efforts to define its product and to guard against degradation or
free riding reflect the difference between interests that a licensor inter-
nalizes and those that motivate licensees. The key consumer advantage
to which the provision responds is a reduction in training costs. But that
same interest, along with complementary interests in providing a valu-
able product to the consumer and in providing a product that is not
108. See William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Antitrust: Source of Dynamic and
Static Inefficiencies?, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS., supra note 31, at
82, 86-95; Frank H. Easterbrook, Ignorance and Antitrust, in id., at 119, 123-32; Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1994); Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. et al.,
Business Restraints and the Clayton Act of 1914: Public- or Private-Interest Legislation?, in
McChesney & Shughart, supra note 79, at 271-86; Fred S. McChesney, Be True to Your
School: Chicago's Contradictory Views of Antitrust and Regulation, in id., at 323-40; Fred
S. McChesney & William F. Shughart, The Unjoined Debate, in id., at 341-44; Oliver E.
Williamson, Antitrust Lenses and the Uses of Transaction Cost Economics Reasoning, in
ANTITRUST, INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS., supra note 31, at 137-58; Ramsey Hanna,
Note, Misusing Antitrust: The Search for Functional Copyright Misuse Standards, 46 STAN.
L. REv. 401 (1994).
Copyright, Licensing, and the "First Screen"
merely appropriated by OEMs substituting their individual interests for
Microsoft's interests and broader consumer interests, runs through a
number of contract provisions.
The important point is not simply that Microsoft's first screen pro-
vision is supported by more than plausible efficiencies. Rather, it is the
danger of a legal requirement that each contract provision be subject to
analysis to identify its singular contribution to the contract. We can be
quite sanguine that principal-agent accords will systematically tend to
achieve efficiencies,"° and the terms chosen by the parties will be those
best designed to harmonize the parties interests given the state of
knowledge at that time. It is another matter altogether, however, to ask
parties to provide explanations that will convince non-parties that spe-
cific efficiencies are associated with any given term. It is worse yet for
parties to be put to the task of proving the magnitude of such efficien-
cies. A good part of the difficulty of assessing the magnitude of
contract-driven efficiencies is a problem common to efficiencies af-
forded by many conventions. Those efficiencies, including the training
cost efficiencies associated with the first screen provision, routinely ap-
pear to convey trivial savings in individual cases, even though in the
aggregate these efficiencies generate enormous consumer value.
If every copyright licensing provision that confers a benefit on the
copyright owner is suspect, the first screen provision certainly can be
questioned. If suspicion attaches to every copyright licensing provision
that confers a benefit on a copyright owner with a large product market
share (in a market drawn around that copyrighted work), the first screen
provision can be listed among the suspects. But licensing should confer
benefit on copyright owners: that is part of the design of copyright law
and of contracts. And success in the marketplace does not dispossess a
firm of the benefits that copyright law and contract generally convey.
Though Microsoft should be able to establish the efficiency-enhancing
properties of the first screen provision, litigation over that provision
takes the law down a road only America's lawyers should want to
travel.
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